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Corporate tax avoidance: is tax
transparency the solution?
LYNNE OATSa* and PENELOPE TUCKb
aTax Administration Research Centre, University of Exeter, Exeter, UK; bBirmingham Business School,
University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
Corporate tax avoidance has been a matter of considerable public attention, particularly since
the 2008 global financial crisis. The nature of calls for tax reform and increased regulation,
advocated most prominently by tax activists and NGOs, has revolved around transparency
as a possible corrective to unacceptable tax avoidance, although there is no consensus as to
what the term tax avoidance encompasses and when it becomes unacceptable. We examine
two responses to calls for increased transparency about the tax affairs of multinational
entities: firstly, country by country reporting that provides information to tax authorities, and
secondly the UK requirement for publication of tax strategies, whereby large companies put
information into the public domain. We find considerable misunderstanding about the
benefits of transparency in this setting. By failing to consider the limits of transparency
initiatives there is a risk of dysfunctional consequences, for example additional costs in
providing and processing additional information, the prospect of increased disputes as new
information generates new misinterpretations and uncertainty in determining the final tax
position. There is a risk that greater disclosure will not effectively address concerns about
unacceptable corporate tax avoidance.
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Introduction
This paper explores the relationship between unacceptable corporate tax avoidance and tax trans-
parency. We consider these two issues in turn, observing the conceptual and definitional difficul-
ties associated with the former, and the complexity and limits of the latter. To illustrate our
arguments, we consider two recent developments in tax disclosure requirements: country by
country reporting and the publication of tax strategies. Reflecting on the potential impact of
these new requirements, we conclude that the costs and benefits of tax transparency are not
well understood, and the potential dysfunctional consequences of greater transparency need to
be considered carefully before changing policies to require even more transparency. The
demand for more transparency often centres on the demand for more information but this is
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problematic because information does not automatically become translated into understanding or
result in behaviour change. In this particular context, an added complication is the multiple under-
standings by different people as to what is meant by the term tax avoidance.
In order to consider whether transparency can be a corrective to unacceptable tax avoidance,
we first need to clarify what is meant by the term tax avoidance.1 Tax liabilities are determined by
reference to tax law: the content and effect of which vary from state to state. The design of the tax
rules applicable to companies is a matter of national sovereignty, albeit constrained in some cases
by supranational laws as in the case of European Union (EU) member states. Like most legis-
lation, tax laws are indeterminate. Picciotto (2015) suggests three levels of indeterminacy, the
first being linguistic – the meaning of the words used depends on social context and is therefore
fluid and dynamic. The second level of indeterminacy relates to liberal legality – law generally
comprises general rules that leave individuals free to make decisions. In the context of laws relat-
ing to economic activity, such as tax law, differences between legal form and economic purpose
exacerbate indeterminacy. The third level relates to the normative character of law – decisions
about its application entail value judgements. This indeterminacy gives rise to differences of
opinion as to the effect of laws. As Gribnau (2017, p. 15) notes ‘once the legislature has
created [a] legal obligation and translated in legal written rules, the rules will inevitably appear
to be imperfect, ambiguous, lagging behind societal, economic and technical developments.’
Laws in respect of the taxation of company profits determine whether or not a tax liability
arises, ‘something happens, and a tax liability is crystallised, something else might happen and
a different tax liability, or even no tax liability, is crystallised’ (Hasseldine and Morris 2018,
p. 437). Tax laws offer choices of action that must be appraised, and then once a choice is
made, implemented. The tax consequences of the options available may not be certain, as a
result of the indeterminacy of the law previously mentioned. Importantly, this decision-making
activity takes place before the tax liability is crystallised. As will be shown below, whether a par-
ticular tax-related decision constitutes unacceptable tax avoidance, which is conceptually distinct
from tax evasion, is a highly contested issue.
Transparency has been associated with good governance for the last twenty or more years
(Hood 2007; Hansen et al. 2015) and with enhanced democracy (Neyland, 2007). There is no
limit to the number of calls for more transparency and there is an unsurpassed demand for
more information, from general pleas to specific freedom of information requests, in the quest
to achieve greater transparency. Transparency has a somewhat mythical status in contemporary
society (Christensen and Cornelissen 2015), a status that ‘insulates it from fundamental critique’
(Hansen et al. 2015, p 125). While recognising that some commentators such as O’Neill (2002)
question the value of transparency, Hood (2007, p. 192) nonetheless suggests that it is one of
those ‘banal’ notions that are pervasive yet unexamined; ‘taken as unexceptionable’ (p. 192). Cer-
tainly there are fundamental questions in relation to what is meant by transparency and what it is
capable of achieving. On one level, transparency by companies involves providing information
that allows society to evaluate their activities, and is often mobilised as a means to some other
end, rather than a goal in itself (Nielson and Madsen 2009).
Writing from this information provision perspective, Schnackenberg and Tomlinson (2016)
conclude that transparency has three dimensions: information disclosure, clarity and accuracy.
They identify three issues of concern: (1) ‘the meaning of information quality, (2) the effects
of transparency on organization – stakeholders relationships and (3) mechanisms that influence
transparency perceptions’ (2016, p. 1789). Additionally, the authors identify an association
between organisational transparency and stakeholder trust, although the evidence is mixed as
to how transparency influences trust and perceptions of trustworthiness (2016, p. 1790). Other,
more critical, scholars of transparency view it as going beyond the provision of information
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and having a performative role. We draw on both views of transparency in our analysis of tax
transparency initiatives.
Returning to the opening question of whether tax transparency is a possible mechanism con-
straining unacceptable tax avoidance, there first needs to be improved understanding of what con-
stitutes unacceptable tax avoidance. The recent insertion of ‘aggressive’ into the debates
(discussed below) has fuelled demands for increased tax transparency. The increased focus on
unacceptable tax avoidance in recent years has led to considerable interest in the phenomenon
beyond the confines of tax specialists. For example, effective tax rates, which look to the ultimate
tax liability of companies rather than the statutory rate of tax, are now being used by a wider range
of stakeholders, no longer only investors, in an attempt to discover whether unacceptable tax
avoidance is taking place.
Transparency is a costly regulatory strategy, not only for the providers of the information but
also for those required to process it. Burdening tax authorities with additional information proces-
sing requirements may not be effective at a time when they are operating under severe resource
constraints. The costs of complying with and monitoring tax transparency initiatives will ulti-
mately be borne by society by placing strain on tax authority resources and by MNEs seeking
to recover the cost, for example, through higher prices for the products and services they
supply. As Freedman (2018) notes, excessive information may obscure and may even become
a smokescreen to disguise company activities. A further question which arises, however, is
whether transparency is capable of achieving what the public wants. Is transparency being
used to solve the wrong problem or has the issue not been sufficiently problematised? If either
of these is the case, the call for greater transparency will not satisfy societal demands that com-
panies pay their fair share of tax.
Tax transparency is a fast-moving field with numerous players seeking to assert dominance in
the debate, not only NGOs but also supranational bodies and national governments. In both public
and scholarly debates about regulation and in particular regulatory failures, the mantra is often
invoked that ‘sunlight provides the best disinfectant’, implying that through transparency,
opening up the decision-making of regulatees, accountability is enhanced and the regulator’s
hand is strengthened. But this must be balanced against the idea that transparency in itself may
only produce an illusion of regulatory control. Sunlight may disinfect, but it also fades; infor-
mation overload can create resource problems for all those concerned to hold companies to
account and may lead to misunderstandings. Transparency measures force disclosure of otherwise
hidden information, but with increased visibility, the capacity of recipients to distinguish relevant
from irrelevant information, to sort the wheat from the chaff, may be impaired and transparency
may not achieve the aims sought by its proponents.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we come back to the
thorny question of what tax avoidance is, and how we can decide whether or not it is unaccep-
table. Following that we probe the concept of transparency drawing on a range of academic scho-
larship before considering in some detail the two tax transparency initiatives identified above –
country by country reporting and publication of tax strategies. We conclude with reflections on
the relationship between tax transparency and unacceptable tax avoidance.
Tax avoidance
At its simplest and broadest, the avoidance of tax means to choose an option that leads to a lower
tax liability than would otherwise apply had another option been chosen. However, in recent years
tax avoidance has become a complex term, meaning different things to different parties. As noted
by Hasseldine and Morris (2018), many conversations take place about tax avoidance as if it were
a singular concept, when actually the participants are talking about different things; it is, as they
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observe, polysemous, or as Freedman (2006, p. 361) terms it, ‘a definitional quagmire’ (see also
Christians 2018). Most agree, however, that tax avoidance is conceptually distinct from tax
evasion, notwithstanding that they are frequently elided in contemporary discourse. The differ-
ence has two aspects, first the relationship with the legislation and second temporal. In relation
to the first of these, tax evasion is a breach of the law and can involve intentional non-disclosure
that may or may not be fraudulent (Gribnau 2015). Tax avoidance in its widest sense encompasses
‘all arrangements to reduce, eliminate or defer a tax liability’ (Freedman, 2004, pp. 335–6). Payne
and Ralborn (2018) state that tax evasion is illegal and also unethical because it entails deception
and concealment. They bifurcate ‘tax avoidance’ into rational business planning on the one hand,
and avoidance that takes advantage of a legal ‘loophole’, the latter being cast as morally question-
able. Many domestic tax laws seek to prevent tax avoidance by looking to the purpose of the legis-
lation and the subjective intentions of taxpayers, but both of these concepts are also elusive (see
Piantavigna 2018 in the context of the EU Anti Tax Avoidance Directive).
In relation to the second aspect of the difference between avoidance and evasion, that of tem-
porality, tax evasion is ex post activity, that is, occurring after the crystallisation of a tax liability.
Tax avoidance, however, is ex ante activity, occurring prior to the crystallisation of the tax liab-
ility; in the appraisal and implementation stage. Running these two aspects together results in
mixing quite different behaviour and leads to confusion (Panayi 2014).
In the past ten years or so, we have witnessed an exponential increase in public attention being
given to ‘tax avoidance’, in connection with the tax affairs of large multinational entities (MNEs).
The heightened awareness of tax avoidance in the context of MNE activities has been fuelled by
attention from the media (e.g. Bergin 2012, Brooks 2014), NGOs (e.g. Action Aid 2011, Christian
Aid 2009, 2014, Oxfam 2016; Oats and Onu 2016) and politicians (e.g. PAC 2013). MNEs are
now ‘expected to behave in a certain way not only by tax authorities but also by civil society’
(Panayi 2014). Morrell and Tuck (2014) describe the emergence of new narratives in the UK
in the 2000s using the metaphor of folk tales to help understand the dynamics between the
various groups of actors, casting them as characters, such as heroes, villains and helpers,
within a fairy tale performing functions that provide conceptual tools to make sense of ‘tax
tale’ developments. Care must be taken, however, in evaluating the validity of the increase in
public attention, in particular as a result of media coverage of alleged malfeasance of specific
MNEs. A number of studies have been shown to lack robustness (Forstater and Christensen
2017) and there is a danger that appeals to public ‘outrage’ may in fact refer to manufactured
indignation based on deliberate misinformation (Oats and Morris 2018).
Notwithstanding the increased attention paid to tax avoidance, little progress has been made in
terms of defining the term tax avoidance, and arguably attempts to do so are largely futile. In a
report produced by the Oxford Centre for Business Taxation for the National Audit Office,2
three categories of legal tax avoidance are distinguished: (1) ineffective avoidance, which can
be countered by existing legislation, (2) effective tax avoidance, that cannot be corrected by
the courts and requires legislative change and (3) using the tax legislation to one’s advantage,
for example leveraging opportunities to reduce tax that are provided for in tax legislation, com-
monly referred to as tax reliefs or tax concessions. Examples include research and development
credits and accelerated depreciation. An international example provided by the authors is where
companies have a high turnover in the UK but make tax-deductible payments such as royalties to
other jurisdictions resulting in a low UK corporate tax liability. For the purposes of this paper, we
use the term ‘unacceptable’ tax avoidance to denote tax related behaviour that falls short of
societal expectations. For some commentators this will include all three categories identified
above; for others it will be confined to the first two, sometimes with an additional rider that
only behaviour that entails artificial and contrived arrangements is unacceptable.
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On the international stage, the G20 summit on 5 November 2012 was a significant turning
point, when Finance Ministers called for a report on the causes of ‘base erosion and profit shifting’
(BEPS), enthusiastically taken up by the OECD and delivered in February 2013 (see Russo 2016).
The OECD BEPS project is profoundly political, and arguably should be more accurately
described as base expansion and power shifting (Oats and Morris 2018) given that it has led to
an expansion of the tax base of many countries and a shift in the balance of tax raising capacity
among jurisdictions. In the years following the release of the initial OECD BEPS action plans in
2015, allegations of unacceptable tax avoidance by multinationals have continued to grab the
headlines and continue to do so after the publication of the BEPS Action final reports in
October 2017. In addition to a misguided blurring of tax avoidance and tax evasion, tax avoidance
now also becomes blurred with ‘artificial’ profit shifting, and we have subsequently seen further
redefinitions of tax avoidance based on alleged departures from economic substance. ‘Profit shift-
ing’, like ‘tax avoidance’ is an ambiguous term that means different things to different people.
Somewhat pessimistically, Picciotto (2015, p. 179) says in relation to BEPS that ‘[t]he patch-
up approach to reform of the rules will inevitably increase uncertainty and conflict, both
between states and enterprises and among states asserting tax claims’.
Much of the media coverage asks that MNEs pay their ‘fair share’; a term that is also subjec-
tive, arbitrary and incomplete (Lamberts 2017, p. 49). In this regard, Datt (2014, pp. 417–8),
writing in an Australian context notes that
[t]o suggest that because some corporate taxpayers have an effective tax rate of 20 or 10 percent as
opposed to the headline rate of 30 percent, they are not paying their fair share is meaningless
unless one knows how the tax is calculated and whether this is in accordance with the law. If in accord-
ance with the law, the reference to ‘fairness’ is redundant.
As Freedman (2018, p. 122) observes, fairness is ‘a perception and so may be shaped and manipu-
lated’ and is used by various groups ‘to convey a sense of dissatisfaction with the current system’.
Campaigning by civil society groups has been an important factor in propelling unacceptable
MNE tax avoidance ‘from a complex issue that was largely the preserve of tax lawyers and
accountants to an issue that sparks political debate and controversy’ (Dallyn 2017, p. 336).
Some commentators (e.g. Dowling 2014, Knuutinen 2014, Lanis and Richardson 2012,
Yliönen and Lane 2015) attempt to frame tax avoidance as an issue of corporate social responsi-
bility. Bird and Davis-Nozemack (2018, p. 1010) note that ‘under this view, tax avoidance rep-
resents a socially irresponsible practice that is inconsistent with a firm’s obligations to society’.
Panayi (2014), however, argues that to say that companies engaging in unacceptable tax avoid-
ance are socially irresponsible is based on too many generalisations and assumptions. She goes
on to say (2014, p. 556) ‘[t]he international tax system is all about choices…why should a
company be deemed socially irresponsible for benefitting from certain choices?’. Laying some
of the responsibility at the feet of nation states, De Wilde (2015, p. 22, cited in Gribnau and
Jallai 2018) says ‘[f]airness in corporate taxation is not a corporate responsibility; it is the respon-
sibility of nation states’. In an analysis of the Australian experience with disclosure of MNE tax
information, Berg and Davidson (2017, p. 96) go so far as to suggest that the ‘corporate tax avoid-
ance debate has many of the hallmarks of a moral panic… dramatic, sudden, characterised by rhe-
torical similarity across media and politics’.
Supranational bodies have attempted to provide some clarity in relation to definitions, adopt-
ing the adjective ‘aggressive’ to denote unacceptable behaviour. In the OECD (2008) Intermedi-
aries Study, for example, considerable attention was given to identifying and requiring disclosure
of unacceptable tax avoidance, described as ‘aggressive tax planning’. The report defined
two types:
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. Planning involving a tax position that is tenable but has unintended and unexpected tax
revenue consequences; and
. taking a tax position that is favourable to the taxpayer without openly disclosing that there
is uncertainty whether significant matters in the tax return accord with the law.
This identification was the result of a failed attempt to reach a consistent definition of ‘unac-
ceptable tax minimisation arrangements’; the term used in the Forum on Tax Administration 2006
Seoul Declaration which initiated the Intermediaries study. Freedman et al. (2009, p. 75) see the
OECD definition as contentious and assert that the relevant test of acceptability is ‘what the legis-
lation says as interpreted by the courts and not what the tax authorities suppose it was intended to
say’. In 2014, the revised draft text of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises makes
reference to aggressive tax planning in relation to the responsibility of board members, endorsing
the recent trend to place tax within corporate governance (Panayi 2014).
The United Nations Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters in
2011 state that:
Tax avoidance occurs when persons arrange their affairs in such a way as to take advantage of the
weakness or ambiguities in the law. Although the means employed are legal and not fraudulent,
the results are considered improper or abusive.
Arguably, however, terms such as ‘aggressive’, ‘improper’ and ‘abusive’ are not helpful in pro-
viding guidance to those required to make judgements about tax behaviour (Hasseldine and
Morris 2018). Scheffer (2013, p. 366) suggests that to ameliorate corporate tax avoidance, an ele-
venth ‘fair taxation’ principle should be added to the United Nations’ Global Compact to include
‘non-resort to tax avoidance schemes’.
There has thus been a recalibration of the scope of tax avoidance in recent years and ‘new visions
of the types of behaviour’ (Oats and Morris 2018, p. 459) captured by the term tax avoidance have
emerged.Christians (2014) argues that ongoingmedia coverageof the effective tax rates of household
brand companies has moved the notion of tax avoidance conceptually closer to tax evasion, in part
fuelled by various offshore leaks. In this sense, there has been a narrowing of the term to largely
exclude from debates tax planning that consists of responding to tax incentives deliberately provided
bygovernments (type3 above) and focusingonbehaviour that is considered tobeunacceptable (types
1 and 2 above). This paved the way for the introduction of the notion of ‘aggressive’ tax avoidance to
signal active steps to reduce a tax liability in a manner that can be considered to be irresponsible or
even immoral. At the same time, there has been a widening of scope in the context of international
transactions and arrangements. Some commentators, such as the Tax Justice Network,3 suggest
that, even though nation states have the sovereign right to choose what to tax and how, the establish-
ment of arrangements that include attribution of profits to low tax jurisdictions constitutes ‘aggressive
tax avoidance’. Thus, in this view, taking advantage of different options affordedwithin domestic tax
laws is viewed as non-aggressive tax avoidance (or tax planning), whereas taking advantage of the
options afforded by different countries’ tax laws is viewed as aggressive.
This recalibration is not universal. In the case of the US, for example, Bank (2017) explores
the question of when tax avoidance became ‘respectable’ and concludes that a shift occurred after
WWII observing that what is remarkable in modern times is that the public reaction to the various
‘scandals’ revealed in the media is muted; they are viewed as relatively non-scandalous. The US
experience therefore appears to be different to that in Europe in particular in that anti-tax avoid-
ance campaigns by civil society activists and NGOs have had less traction there. This is similarly
reflected in the stance of the US towards BEPS; largely disengagement and pursuit of an indepen-
dent programme of reform of international tax rules within the US tax code.
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The tax advisory profession has not been quiescent in the face of heightened concerns about
tax avoidance and allegations of impropriety by tax advisors (e.g. PAC 2015). Although there is
no formal requirement in the UK for tax advisors to be registered, they are usually members of
one of several professional bodies. In 1995, seven professional bodies, including ICAEW,
came together to produce a document entitled Professional Conduct in Relation to Taxation
(PCRT).4 The document sets out guidance for members on how they should act in relation to
the tax work that they do. In 2016 the guidance was updated to incorporate a set of Standards
for Tax Planning to deal with the provision of advice to clients on tax planning arrangements.
The new standard states:
Members must not create, encourage or promote tax planning arrangements or structures that i) set out
to achieve results that are contrary to the clear intention of Parliament in enacting relevant legislation
and/or ii) are highly artificial or highly contrived and seek to exploit shortcomings within the relevant
legislation.
The new standard responds to the Government’s challenge to the profession in March 2015 (HMT
2015, p. 3):
Asking the regulatory bodies who police professional standards to take on a greater lead and respon-
sibility in setting and enforcing clear professional standards around the facilitation and promotion of
avoidance to protect the reputation of the tax and accountancy profession and to act for the greater
public good.
The wording of the standard for tax planning was apparently tested in discussions with HMRC as
to how it would apply in illustrative situations to ensure that only abusive behaviour would be
subject to sanction. The current PCRT came into effect from 1 March 2017.
In summary, tax avoidance has morphed from being an arcane phenomenon, the parameters of
which were reasonably well understood by tax specialists and large business taxpayers, to some-
thing more politically charged, with a proliferation of definitions, variations, interpretations and
understandings. Given the current lack of agreement about the scope of the term unacceptable tax
avoidance, the quest for policy prescriptions to tackle it has become increasingly complex.
The clarion call among activists and others who are dissatisfied with the apparent prevalence
of tax avoidance by MNEs is for greater transparency. Calls are not only for transparency from
MNEs themselves about their tax affairs, but also transparency from governments, asking them
to provide more information about the tax concession and arrangements made to accommodate
MNEs. The provision of special legislative and administrative concessions is, of course, part
of the political backdrop to international profit shifting; providing ex ante choices about where
to locate activities and transactions so as to reduce worldwide tax liabilities. The focus of this
paper is, however, on attempts to constrain unacceptable corporate tax avoidance rather than
the enablers of avoidance such as government sanctioned reliefs and concessions. In the next
section, we discuss the academic literature dealing with transparency in a regulatory setting.
Transparency
The concept of transparency has been studied from a variety of perspectives. For the purposes of
this paper, we draw primarily on work within the organisation and management literature and
focus on transparency projects requiring company disclosure. The term transparency refers to a
‘wide array of objects, uses, technologies and practices’ (Hansen et al. 2015, p. 118). Albu and
Flyverbom (2019), in their meta analysis of extant literature, identify two paradigmatic positions,
verifiability approaches that focus on transparency as provision of information for accountability
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purposes, and performativity approaches that emphasise the ways in which transparency projects
do more than just passively provide access to information, but also actively shape the information
itself, the providers and the recipients of information. We use this distinction to first consider argu-
ments framed under the verifiability approach, before turning our attention to performativity
aspects.
In line with the verifiability view that transparency is primarily concerned with the provision
of information, there is a common belief that transparency can address the asymmetric aspects of
information (Nielson and Madsen 2009). The receiver has less information than the supplier of
that information. Information is also produced for a purpose tailored to fit the transparency criteria
(Neyland, 2007). Consideration of both the provider and recipient of information allows us to then
consider how information is received as well as how it is presented. Highlighting accountability,
Drew et al. (2004, p. 1462), for example, define transparency as ‘information that allows all
people who are interested in a decision to understand what is being decided, why and where’.
The verifiability view is also concerned with the quality and quantity of information, which is
something companies can tactically manipulate to influence perceptions of transparency
(Schnackenberg and Tomlinson 2016). Transparency here is viewed as shining light on organis-
ational realities. It is seen as a mechanism for the provider of information to demonstrate trust-
worthiness and the recipient to evaluate legitimacy, it assumes that recipients of information
are willing and able to interpret it, and is most commonly assumed to have positive consequences
(Albu and Flyverbom 2019).
Scholarship within the performativity strand pushes back on studies that confine transparency
to a flow of information and conceptualise transparency as a more complex social process, shot
through with conflict, tension and power, that is capable of producing socio-material effects.
Transparency then is not merely a nominative term but has the capacity to act or precipitate
action; it is ‘an active process of translation, mediation and mutation’ which may lead to unin-
tended consequences (Albu and Flyverbom, 2019, p. 280). Hansen et al. (2015, p. 120) note,
that even when transparency is able to achieve ‘noble objectives’, it may nonetheless produce
unintended side effects, including increased uncertainty and suspicion; even where there is a
genuine desire to achieve clarity through transparency, there will be hidden dimensions that frus-
trate these aims.
In this view the information provided by transparency projects is itself not neutral, it is pro-
duced for a purpose and the choice of information will reflect that purpose (Tsoukas 1997).
Roberts (2018, p. 54.) suggests that a problem of transparency in organisational practice is that
‘we act as if we believe in the adequacy and completeness of what is disclosed…while
knowing that it is not’. Transparency is a mediated concept through which various disclosure
devices are employed to give the impression of transparency (Hansen and Flyverbom, 2015).
The extent of disclosure is also important. There are arguments that too much transparency
leads to overwhelming detail (cf. McBarnett, 1991) and obscures underlying activities. Stohl
et al. (2016, p. 133) refer to this as ‘inadvertent opacity’ to describe the situation where ‘visibility
produces such great quantities of information that important pieces of information become inad-
vertently hidden in the detritus of the information made visible’. Visibility and transparency are
often conflated, but contrasting transparency and visibility allows us to call the mythical status of
transparency into question: increased transparency can reduce visibility. Zyglipopoulos and
Fleming (2011) describe the determination of what is made transparent and what is not as the
‘politics of visibility’ (p. 693) and remind us of the need to question the assumption that the cor-
porate world has been made more visible and accountable as a result of globalised information
flows.
The fact that we do not know what we are not seeing results in the demand for more infor-
mation: ‘Scandals and misconduct have been exposed in the raw light of information and
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communication for decades without producing a marked increase in our ability to see into the
complexities of organizational behaviour’ (Christensen and Cheney 2015, p. 82). This final
point calls into question the efficacy of demands for increased transparency. More information
may actually lead to less understanding (Tsoukas 1997). In addition, common interpretations
of transparency focus on the information itself and tend to neglect the underpinning reasons
for the creation and use of that information (Christensen and Cheney 2015).
Much of the scholarship dealing with transparency is normative, ‘dominated by policy and
management-oriented scholarship looking for solutions to problems associated with
globalization’ (Hansen et al. 2015, p. 120). In governance terms, transparency requirements
increasingly appear as soft law, that is codes of conduct and guidelines. In our view, however,
transparency is multidimensional, complex and does not always lead to neat solutions. Flyberbom
(2015, p. 173) suggests ‘[t]ransparency is best understood as an ambiguous, partial and imperma-
nent ‘script’ that is circulated, edited and translated’. Ananny and Crawford (2016, p. 6) go so far
as to say that ‘transparency can do great harm’ and that if not implemented carefully can ‘inhibit
honest conversation’. Roberts (2018, p. 54) describes transparency as ‘an alluring but deceptive
ideal’.
Specific to the tax context, and linking corporate tax avoidance and tax transparency, Forstater
(2017, p. 569) notes that:
‘[t]here is broad agreement that companies should not practice “aggressive avoidance,” but little
clarity in the public debate about what that means.’… ‘Business leaders, tax professionals, and organ-
izations representing a range of interests continue to talk past each other, contributing to the public
growing ever-more cynical (and ever more confused). Data alone may not solve the problem. It is
not clear whether the disputed information would allow stakeholders to assess whether a particular
company has stepped over the line or, conversely, allow companies to defend their reputations
through transparency.’
Gribnau and Jallai (2018, p. 15) echo these sentiments, noting that ‘access to public data as such
does not guarantee public understanding. Moreover, it should not be taken for granted that people
will use the information they obtained to make rational judgements and decisions.’ Freedman
(2018) links transparency and trust, noting that if transparency is increased but justified trust in
institutions is not, the aims behind transparency will not be served.
In summary, transparency without discernment or understanding may not be an effective regu-
latory tool. In light of this, in the next section, we consider two recent attempts to achieve greater
transparency in the MNE tax setting.
Disclosure initiatives
In order to explore the relationship between tax avoidance and transparency we consider two
specific forms of disclosure initiatives, one requiring limited disclosure to tax authorities only
and the other requiring public disclosure. The first is country by country reporting, currently
enacted in most jurisdictions as limited disclosure to tax authorities but facing strident calls for
public access to such information. The second is the UK requirement for publication of tax strat-
egies by large companies. Whilst not comprehensive, in that other countries have implemented or
are planning similar measures (see for example Hoopes et al. (2018) regarding Australia), these
two forms of disclosure serve to highlight the complexities associated with identifying the target
of the policy intervention and the limits to transparency as a mechanism for achieving
policy goals.
The early initiatives designed to increase disclosures by corporates were largely voluntary and
also targeted at specific industries, for example, the Extractives Industries Transparency
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Initiative.5 Over time, some of these initiatives have developed into mandatory requirements. The
change, which started to accelerate around 2012, can be attributed to the growing voice of civil
society as the impact of austerity put pressure on tax administrations to tackle, and be seen to be
tackling, tax avoidance. Indeed, as Christians (2012) notes, the quest for tax transparency has
grown from a campaign by a small group of anti-corruption activists, to a global movement.
Country by country reporting
Country by country reporting requires disclosure of various indictors of activity by reference to
the geographical location in which they take place, for example, the number of employees and
turnover. The perceived need for country by country reporting arises as a result of two specific
features of the international tax system as it relates to taxing MNE profits. The first is the separate
entity principle, under which each part of an MNE is treated as a separate entity for taxing pur-
poses. MNEs operate in different countries in a variety of ways, both as subsidiaries, whose sales,
purchases etc. will be separately disclosed to tax authorities and for company law purposes, and
also as divisions (permanent establishments) of other companies located in different territories. In
the latter case, the results of the activities in one particular territory may or may not be disclosed to
tax authorities in another territory, depending on whether there is a taxable presence according to
domestic tax law, in which case the results would not generally be separately disclosed for
company law purposes.
The second arises from the need to allocate MNE profits to the jurisdictions in which it oper-
ates. The separate entity principle results in the need to take into account intra-MNE transactions
in order to achieve a more accurate inter-nation allocation of profits. The current international
norm is the arm’s length principle, by which each subsidiary or permanent establishment is
treated as if it were an independent entity and transactions between these entities valued at an
arm’s length price (effectively market value, if available). In a world in which there is consider-
able divergence between countries in terms of tax rates and the definition of the tax base, there
have long been concerns that the process of determining arm’s length prices provides MNEs
with too much latitude to allocate group profits judiciously so as to minimise the overall world-
wide tax liability (Oats et al. 2017; Picciotto 1992; 2017).
Calls for country by country reporting arise because of these features of the international tax
system as it currently operates, and they ostensibly seek to provide increased accountability of
MNEs in terms of how the overall group profits are allocated to countries for tax purposes.
This issue has been made more pressing in light of recent concerns about international profit shift-
ing as a form of unacceptable tax avoidance. Wójcik (2015, p. 1175) observes that the idea of
country by country reporting emerged ‘out of concerns of [civil society organisations] about cor-
ruption, corporate power and environmental sustainability’.
The Tax Justice Network (2003) proposal to the International Accounting Standards Board
(Murphy 2003) called for a new standard requiring reporting of sales, purchases, value of
resources used, value added, profits and tax for each country in which MNEs operate. Longhorn
et al. (2016) describe the approach promulgated by the Tax Justice Network and taken up by other
civil society groups as ‘maximalist’, referring to its detailed reporting requirements. The Inter-
national Accounting Standards Board did not take up this proposal, nor a subsequent joint pro-
posal (Publish What You Pay and Tax Justice Network) in relation to segment reporting in
2005. The campaign for country by country reporting was given impetus by the global financial
crisis and new organisations joined, leading to the US Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 and action in the
EU (see below). Lesage and Kaçar (2013) trace the ‘journey’ of the idea of country by country
reporting, noting the significant influence of civil society organisations in pushing the idea into
the public consciousness and reflecting on the obstacles to full realisation of public country by
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country reporting. More recently, the Tax Justice Network has called for a public database to
account for the economic activities and tax contributions of MNEs (Cobham, Gray & Murphy
2017), believing that it will reveal the extent of ‘profit misalignment’.
The expressed motivations for advocating country by country reporting vary. For some advo-
cates such as tax authorities, it is seen as strengthening the armoury of tax authorities in their
analysis of transfer pricing under the current arm’s length principle. For others, such as the
Tax Justice Network, it is a step along the path to a more radical overhaul of international tax
rules for MNEs (Baden and Wigan 2017; Christians 2012; Picciotto 2017). This latter group
have long bemoaned deficiencies in arm’s length pricing as the standard mechanism for allocating
profits of MNEs between different taxing jurisdictions.
Country by country reporting first appeared on the OECD agenda of the Global Forum on
Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (Christians 2012), providing a cat-
alyst for transparency activists to bring it to the attention of the public. The issue subsequently
became part of the BEPS project and the OECD’s BEPS Action 13 final report recommends man-
datory country by country reporting to provide tax administrations with information they need to
be able to conduct informed transfer pricing risk analysis, to ensure taxpayer compliance with the
arm’s length principle and to provide tax administrations with information to inform audit strat-
egies. The country by country report requires disclosure of revenues, earnings before income tax,
income tax paid, the current income tax charge, stated capital and accumulated earnings, number
of employees, and tangible assets other than cash. This provides information about the global
value chain of the MNE and a crude measure of the distribution of aspects of various elements
of economic activity across countries. Importantly, what the country by country reporting does
not do, is provide all of the data to verify transfer pricing based on arm’s length pricing, for
example, information related to hard-to-value intangibles. Baden and Wigan (2017, p. 134)
explore the ‘constellation of and dynamics between professional organisations’ involved in the
development of country by country reporting, showing how activist and market agendas intersect
in this particular transnational issue.
The OECD version of country by country reporting does not consider user groups other than
tax administrations who are recommended to use them for risk assessment purposes and not as a
basis for audit adjustments (Hanlon 2018). Importantly, however, country by country reports are
to be shared with other tax authorities, which raises additional concerns about the protection of
confidentiality. The requirements recommended by the OECD have been implemented unilater-
ally by a number of jurisdictions. Indeed, as of January 2018, some 60 jurisdictions had intro-
duced country by country reporting filing obligations.6 The implementation of country by
country reporting is subject to peer review by OECD members and the first annual peer review
report was released in May 2018. The terms of reference for peer review were released by the
OECD in February 2017 (OECD 2017) and the reviews focus on three key aspects:
. The domestic legal and administrative framework;
. The exchange of information framework; and
. The confidentiality and appropriate use of country by country reporting documents
In parallel with the OECD’s deliberations on BEPS leading to recommendations on country
by country reporting, the European Commission has been working towards increased transpar-
ency in order to tackle unacceptable tax avoidance by MNEs. In March 2015, the European Com-
mission launched a Tax Transparency Package. This was followed by endorsement of an Action
plan on a Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System in the EU in June of the same year. The Euro-
pean Commission’s version of country by country reporting goes further than the OECD by pro-
posing that large companies publish tax-related information for every EU jurisdiction in which
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they operate. In 2016, the Commission conducted a public consultation on transparency in which
some 422 respondents participated, comprising firms, industry associations, private individuals
and NGOs. The results of the consultation demonstrate a significant divide between the opinions
of businesses and their advisers on the one hand, and trade unions and NGOs on the other. The
business group were clearly of the view that the EU should rely on international initiatives,
whereas, unsurprisingly, the NGO group advocated the EU going beyond the BEPS recommen-
dation to extended disclosure requirements.7
While the disclosure of information to relevant tax authorities is accepted as enabling tax auth-
orities to fulfil their task, the view of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and others
(Cockfield and MacArthur 2015) is that it is imperative that the information remain confidential
and not be made available to the wider public.
The UK was one of the first countries to commit to country by country reporting on a formal
basis in February 2016, giving Treasury power to make regulations in relation to country by
country reporting. The subsequently enacted 2016 regulations8 require MNEs to provide
HMRC with information to ‘help HMRC better assess international tax avoidance risks’.
Approximately 300 UK headquartered MNEs are required to complete the template annually.
Updates to regulation were released in 2017 to reflect subsequent guidance issued by
the OECD and the commitment by the EU to a Directive to implement country by country
reporting.
Wójcik (2015) notes that country by country reporting, as introduced in the US and the EU,
would not have been possible without an unprecedented engagement of civil society organis-
ations, and a degree of convergence of their development, tax justice and environmental
agendas. Publish What You Pay and the Tax Justice Network mobilised numerous civil society
organisations and coordinated their activities across the Atlantic in a struggle against established
norms of accounting. However, without the global financial crisis, which made politicians, media,
and the public much more receptive to the country by country reporting idea, new legislation
might have never occurred. Certainly, in its mandated form, country by country reporting pro-
vides additional information to tax authorities to allow them to better risk assess the allocation
of profits between jurisdictions (Christians 2012).
Hanlon (2018) outlines several advantages and disadvantages of country by country report-
ing. Potential benefits include forcing companies to articulate their transfer pricing strategies
and structure, so as to generate positive behavioural change as these issues are brought to the
attention of corporate management. Potential costs include additional compliance costs relating
to the need to gather and analyse additional data, as well as new risks associated with increased
disputes resulting from the tax authorities having access to additional information. In addition,
Hanlon notes that the limitations of the country by country reporting data may not be well under-
stood, leading to misuse by tax authorities. Evers et al. (2017) argue that the benefits of country by
country reporting lack a theoretical foundation and do not appear to outweigh the costs. They
contend that legislative solutions dealing with the gaps in tax law are preferable as a strategy
for constraining unacceptable tax avoidance.
This first example of a new disclosure requirement is motivated by a desire for increased
transparency, but its effectiveness may be limited because the information is only provided to
tax authorities, despite continued calls for wider dissemination. In the next example, we look
at a transparency initiative that resulted in public disclosure.
Tax strategy disclosures
In the UK, since 2016, all large companies are required to publish a board-approved tax strategy
statement that is consistent with the overall strategy of the business and is made available to the
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public. Many large businesses were already voluntarily publishing strategies in some form or
another prior to the introduction of a legislative requirement to do so, ranging in length from
‘haikus to epics’ (Forstater, 2016, p. 10). Many were based on tax principles published by
bodies such as the UK’s Confederation of British Industry or the OECD business group,
BIAC. A PwC report (PwC 2016) found that 64 out of the FTSE 100 companies in 2015 were
voluntarily disclosing their approach to tax. The report noted that companies declared their com-
pliance with applicable tax laws and payment of tax based on the tax laws in the jurisdictions in
which they operate, reflecting reporting of form and a lack of engagement with substance.
Freedman and Vella (2016) describe the transition of the tax strategy requirement from the
initial consultation document in which the idea was floated to the final legislation. They
observe that the measure appears to be based on an assumption that forcing disclosure of a tax
strategy will somehow reduce the tax risk appetite of the businesses concerned. The rules
apply to MNE groups, regardless of where the parent is located, with turnover of £200 m or
more or £2bn of assets. HMRC has issued guidance for qualifying groups, specifying that the
tax strategy must be published online and as either a separate document or a self contained
part of a wider document (without necessarily using the term ‘strategy’). The strategy should
contain the following, in relation to UK taxation:
. Approach to risk management and governance arrangements;
. Attitude towards tax planning;
. Level of risk the group is prepared to accept; and
. Approach towards its dealings with HMRC.
Approximately 2000 large companies are required to publish their tax strategies and strategy
statements began to appear in 2018 with varying degrees of informativeness. As Forstater (2016,
p. 11) notes in relation to mandated disclosure as a policy tactic, ‘[t]he thinking is that disclosure
can work in three different ways: pressuring companies to achieve basic compliance; enhancing
governance and management; and consolidating and rewarding leading practice’. Requiring state-
ments from all large corporates is consistent with the UK approach to managing this segment of
the taxpaying population more broadly i.e. that the same principles apply to all large corporates
irrespective of whether it is, in some cases, redundant.
The fifth edition of PwC’s tax transparency series (PwC 2018) reveals an increase in disclos-
ures and observes that a few companies are now making more innovative disclosures. Some 14
FTSE 100 companies published a stand alone tax strategy report in 2017.
By way of example, the transparency statement in Vodafone’s published Tax Risk Manage-
ment Strategy document (Vodafone 2017) demonstrates the tension arising when willingness to
providing information proactively to tax authorities are not reciprocated:
Transparency goes beyond the observation of all applicable laws, rules, regulations and disclosure
requirements. It requires the proactive consideration of the provision of information to tax authorities
in respect of tax relevant facts and circumstances if they will aid the resolution of the matter under
discussion. For example if information not available in a territory is requested, Vodafone will not
‘hide’ behind territorial borders or the absence of legal obligations but will take reasonable efforts
to provide the relevant fact based information. This is a fundamental element of our aim to
develop and foster good working relationships with tax authorities. There is however a limit to proac-
tive transparency where over time a relevant tax administration does not show it is willing to make its
own contribution to a good and professional working relationship with Vodafone.
For this particular MNE, then, transparency is a two-way street. The Vodafone document makes a
further statement in relation to artificial tax arrangement as follows:
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The tax code of conduct provides that we will enter into tax planning where the financial benefit is tax
related but we will not engage in artificial tax arrangements. The test of artificiality is generally
aligned with the existence of commercial purpose.
In an overview of extant published strategy statements, Forstater (2018, p. 18) observes that ‘[i]t
does not seem possible to robustly score or rank companies based on their published strategies.
Short and simple strategies do not necessarily correspond with higher risk, or more aggressive tax
planning. Longer tax strategies can simply reflect wordier statements and fancier graphics’. Such
is the case with all disclosure initiatives, be they voluntary or mandatory. Lavermiccoca and
Buchan (2015, p. 6) suggest ‘the requirement to disclose information places pressure on
company decision makers to consider the implications of the disclosure on their
relationship with stakeholders’. On the other hand, Holland et al. (2016) study more general cor-
porate tax disclosures over an 11 year period and conclude (p. 314) that that the ‘increased tax
related disclosures are by themselves unlikely to change tax decisions made by all managers.’
There is certainly resistance to tax transparency and some suggest that it will not necessarily
lead to increased revenues, but rather will change the tax competition landscape between
countries (Alexander 2013).
Discussion and conclusion
Some of those calling for increased transparency are not solely motivated by a desire to improve
the international taxation of MNE profits and that there are power struggles at play, for example,
NGOs using the issue to promote other agendas (Oats and Morris 2018). Observing a lack of
empirical evidence as to the effects of greater transparency, Christians (2012, p. 12) notes,
[t]hose in favour of protecting privacy argue that increased disclosure of tax information would
provide taxpayers with both incentive and a roadmap to decreasing their own taxes, while impeding
the ability of governments to maintain an image of the tax system as an even-handed instrument of the
rule of law. Those in favour of more transparency argue that tax information disclosure either
increases or has negligible effects on compliance.
There are two separate issues here, one is the content of disclosure and the other is the audience
for the disclosures. It has been argued that for MNEs, ‘[i]ncreased transparency and disclosure are
the price for increased border flexibility’ (Ring 2018, p. 2), suggesting that there is an inevitability
to increased transparency. However one of the initiatives outlined above calls for the disclosure of
information that is not necessarily informative as a means of identifying wrongdoing, in particular
the publication of tax strategy statements. Freedman (2018, p. 130) cautions against assuming that
transparency will be a panacea stating ‘we have to be careful about seeing transparency as uni-
versally good’. Drawing on O’Neill (2002), she notes that a flood of unsorted information can
create confusion and uncertainty and may even create incentives for dishonesty.
In terms of the audience for disclosures, the danger of misinterpretation of information is real,
as a consequence of transparency without visibility. Forstater (2017), for example, explores the
case of the Greens-European Foreign Alliance Group report into the Spanish headquartered
fashion company group Inditex and demonstrates that simplistic calculations and unrealistic
assumptions can lead to accusations of wrongdoing that do not hold up to close scrutiny. In
this case, the report suggests that Inditex having a Swiss holding company constitutes ‘aggressive
avoidance’, yet many countries legislate to attract holding companies.
It is not just the public, or the media, however that may misinterpret transparency disclosures.
In the context of understanding the import of leaked data, Oei & Ring (2018) note that there is
significant variation in tax authorities in terms of their willingness to use, or ignore, the data.
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These different priorities and capabilities among tax authorities similarly constrain their ability to
absorb and process mandated disclosures under the auspices of transparency initiatives. A poten-
tial consequence of increased disclosure of information to tax authorities, such as through country
by country reporting, is increased audit pressure and disputes. Compliance costs for MNEs can be
expected to increase as they not only have to gather, frame and disclose additional information to
wider audiences, but also deal with conflicting demands from different tax authorities and
increased regulatory scrutiny as more jurisdictions turn their attention to enforcement against
MNEs (e.g. Tennant and Tracey 2019). New systems and processes will be required to better inte-
grate tax data with other information systems within organisations. Finally, the performativity of
transparency will most likely lead to changed behaviour, but not necessarily in the form desired by
those who call for greater transparency. Whether these costs, not all of which are quantifiable, are
outweighed by the benefits of greater knowledge about the activities of MNEs remains to be seen.
Notes
1. We do not purport to provide an exhaustive analysis of what ‘tax avoidance’ is, but rather draw on a
number of relevant studies to highlight that it is a contested phenomenon, the scope of which has
changed over time and continues to change.
2. The Oxford Centre for Business Tax Report for the National Audit Office, entitled Tax Avoidance, dated
3 December 2010 is no longer available online but is on file with the current authors.
3. For numerous reports and commentaries on the subject of corporate tax avoidance see https://www.
taxjustice.net.
4. The PCRT can be obtained from various sources including https://www.icaew.com/technical/tax/pcrt.
5. Following GlobalWitness’ publication of ‘ACrude Awakening’ https://www.globalwitness.org/en/archive/
crude-awakening/ in 1999, the Publish What You Pay network began campaigning for transparency in the
extractive industries leading to the Extractive Industries Transparency Imitative launched in 2002.
6. For current information about country by country reporting information, see https://www.oecd.org/tax/
automatic-exchange/country-specific-information-on-country-by-country-reporting-implementation.
htm.
7. The manner in which the EU country by country reporting requirements are to be implemented by way
of amendment to the Accounting Directive, rather than a tax measure, has been the subject of investi-
gation. The Legal Service of the European Council gave an opinion in November 2016 disagreeing with
the approach of the EC, stating that the matter falls under Article 115 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union (TFEU) thereby requiring unanimity among member states. In January 2017,
however, the European Parliament’s Committee of Legal Affairs gave an opinion that the legal basis
must be Article 50(1) of the TFEU, under which only a qualified majority of member states is required.
In February 2017 the European Parliament Rapporteurs put forward amendments to the proposed direc-
tive amending directive 2013/34/EU to broaden its scope to require public disclosure.
8. The Taxes (Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) (Country by Country Reporting) Regulations.
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